Th is article aims to present selected elements of SC's development in the fi eld of International Relations (IR) theory. It underlines the role played by sociology of knowledge and the transformative moment of the end of the Cold War. Th e main focus of this article is put on the process of mainstreaming SC in IR. Th is articles presents a summary, reminding one the fundamental premises of SC and their potential in IR and in social sciences in general. It is especially important today, as we face the situation where "everyone writes, but no one reads anymore" (Bok, 2015) .
Ascendancy of SC in International Relations
SC in IR has basically two backgrounds: the sociology of knowledge and the Fourth Great Debate. Th e constructivist paradigm was from the very beginning positioned in opposition to the dominant status of realism and liberalism and their neo versions. Th e process that prepared the ground for SC's appearance in IR was the debate, especially in the 1980s, between liberal institutionalists and realist structuralists (Waltz, 1979; Keohane 1993) . Th e liberals, referring to the idealists' tradition, were arguing that elements such as culture, collective biographies of nations or religion do matter.
Th e historical event that facilitated the appearance of social constructivism (SC) was obviously the fall of Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar Cold War world. Th e dominant IR theories of realism and liberalism were blamed for not predicting this epoch-changing phenomenon (Cox, 2008) . Th erefore, not only were the predictive potential of the theories of rationalist paradigm put into question, but also their explanatory power. It turned out that theories using an essentialist, static approach to social reality were not enough for the description and explanation of a fl uxional, constantly changing, globalising world and its transition to a predominantly multi-polar and unstable world order. Th e dominant impression was that rationalist theories, aiming at the creation of robust models of reality, with constant and stable elements, were overtaken and left behind by the ever-alternating 7 (2)/2019 reality. Th is in turn brought the need for a new ontological and epistemological approach that would be able to catch up with the post-Cold War reality. SC was developed as a part of an answer to this demand in IR.
Defi cits of rationalist theories are neatly explained by Christian Reuss-Smit (2005) in his chapter on constructivism in "Globalization of World Politics" . First, the rationalist paradigm assumes that the character of main IR actors is pre-social and static. Th e general assumption is that the main actor of IR is a state and that its nature, goals, interests and needs are constant and given exogenously. Th e second assumption stems logically from the fi rst one: because a state is a pre-social actor, the interactions within the IR system do not change its structure, ergo they are not to be taken into account. Th ird, the society itself is not a dynamic, changing actor but a "strategic domain", whose sole purpose is to fulfi l states' egoist interests op.cit. 192) . Of course, these statements in their classic versions refer mostly to the theory of realism, but they are present also in liberalism, as they characterise in general the rationalist paradigm. Neoliberalism, with its focus on low politics and internal dynamics of the state and which embraces culture to some extent, may be seen as a step towards constructivism.
Th e rationalist assumptions on the insignifi cance of social interactions between IR seems to be unsuitable for the description of international relations. Th is presumption, implicating de facto a lack of change in IR, appeared to be ineff ective at the end of the Cold War and is so today. Interactions shaping trends (micro, macro and mega) are bringing constant changes to the world. By ignoring this fact, rationalist paradigms limited its potential to describe, explain and predict trends in IR eff ectively (Walt, 1998) . Constructivist paradigm was a part of an answer to these conditions.
Main trends within SC: variance and convergence
Th e genesis of SC in IR has to include an anti-positivist breakthrough marked by the rise of critical theories. Modernist (Jürgen Habermas) and postmodernist schools (Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault), though with diff erent views on the issue of minimal foundationalism, agreed essentially on the constructivist ontology (Linklater, 2007) . Th ere were two signifi cant trends observable within the stream of SC in IR. One of them treats SC as a meta-theory, a paradigm or a social theory that does not deal with empirical testing of given hypotheses. In this perspective, there is no ambition to create theoretical competition for the realists and liberals. It was rather used to explain the social character of every human endeavour, including international relations (Guzzini & Leander, 2006) . Th e second trend in turn, which appeared to attract more attention at the end of 1980s and 1990s, aimed at challenging the conceptual toolbox of rationalist theories (vide: Wendt, 1999; Christiansen, Jorgensen & Wiener, 1999) . In the end, aft er SC ascended to a mainstream position of IR, the reconciliation between constructivist and rationalist paradigms took place. Th e more conventional (and foundational) constructivist theoreticians, like Alexander Wendt, agreed on certain level of reifi cation ("rump materialism", Wendt, op. cit; 1995) . In eff ect, the positivist methodology does not evoke such controversies anymore within SC. Conventional constructivists agree that "no matter how, as long as it does the job", or as long as the given methods explain the mechanism of social construction of meanings, they are acceptable. Th is reconciliation ended a period of theoretical develop-7 (2)/2019 ment and confl ict with the rationalist paradigm and marked the beginning of a period of normal science done from the constructivist perspective (Kuhn, 1996) .
Th e division within the community of critical theorists between modernists and postmodernists is refl ected in the division between conventional and critical social constructivists. Th e former represents the so-called "weaker" version of constructivism as it agrees on a wider spectrum of foundationalism than the latter. Th at is why critical constructivism is called a "strong" program of constructivism (Latour, 1999) . Th e conventional one, as mentioned above, is closer, especially methodologically, to a positivist paradigm, whereas the critical constructivism tends to reject positivism and focuses on refl ective and interpretative methodology.
Alexander Wendt is perceived as one of the most notable representatives of the conventional constructivism, as he tried to chart a via media between the rationalist and constructivist paradigm. His version of SC is oft en described as "structural" because of the agreement with Waltzian premise about the existence of a relatively stable international relations' structure (Wendt, op. cit.) . One of the fi rst representatives of critical constructivism was Nicholas Onuf. He focused on rules regulating social life as a whole and on how they are responsible for the production of social structures and organising social interactions. Th e main diff erence lies in the fact that Onuf (1989) does not reify any structures or rules. Th ey are in a constant process of mutual production/reproduction between the agents and structures.
Ted Hopf (1998) presented this distinction in a concise and readable manner by dividing his analysis into the following categories: ■ Ontology. Conventional constructivism argues that the agreement within the epistemic community on widely accepted, intersubjective statements is possible ("minimal foundationalism"). Critical constructivism states it is neither possible, nor desirable. Each concept and phenomenon should be analysed as original and unique in reference to its inimitable context. ■ Epistemology. Conventional constructivists accept intersubjective rules of the positivist methodology and accept the intersubjective nature of knowledge. Critical constructivists argue that intersubjectivity is impossible and leads to reifi cation of the research subjects, making the whole research endeavour invalid. Eff orts aimed at ensuring intersubjectivity would only lead to an artifi cial perception of the social process as stable and static. ■ Identity. Conventional constructivism focuses mainly on reproductive practices. By knowing these practices, one may be able to establish predispositions of a given actor to behave in a certain way under certain circumstances. Th ese predispositions and circumstance can be generalised. Th e critical version rejects the possibility of such generalisations and focuses on understanding how actors accept given statements as true and reject others as false. By scrutinising myths, which are crucial elements constituting identity, one learns to understand given identity -it does not allow for prediction of behaviours (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996) . ■ Position of a researcher. From the conventional perspective, the researcher is analysing a phenomenon from the outside. Th ey are, to some extent, an objective observer who simply describes and explains a research subject without interfering with it. Th e critical approach states that a researcher, by the very fact of making an observation, shapes the research subject and is also shaped by the research subject ("double her-7 (2)/2019 meneutic"; Giddens, 1984) . Th erefore, "objectivity" does not exist for the critical constructivists. ■ Power. Conventional constructivism perceives the category of power as analytically neutral. It recognises that social interactions are strongly infl uenced by the relations of power. Th e role of science is to identify and describe the relation. Critical constructivism puts the hierarchy and inequality of power distribution in the centre of its agenda. Th e aim of science is to debunk these hierarchical relations and change them into emancipating societies from the rules of subordination (Taylor, 1996) .
Both conventional and critical versions of SC vary greatly. We could even state that sometimes they are opposite to each other. At the same time, they still represent the same constructivist paradigm and they share fundamental assumptions about social life.
■ Both aim at "denaturalisation" of the social world. Constructivism assumes that social reality is socially constructed, so the "naturality" does not exist objectively. Th e term "natural" is only used to describe a wide consensus on the meanings of a given concept within a given community. Th e validity of the consensus is limited by time and space. ■ Th e aim of SC is, most of all, to describe and understand the process of meanings' production and reproduction (Zehfuss, 2002) . ■ Objectivity does not exist, but intersubjectivity is the "lowest common denominator", allowing for any relevant exchange of meanings. Th e reality is not objective, but it can be at least communicated in an intersubjective way (Scheff , 2006) . ■ All research subjects have to be contextualised. ■ Th ere is a link between power and knowledge. Control over knowledge may give power and power may give control over knowledge. Constructivists want to reveal this relation and understand it (Onuf, op.cit) . ■ Agents and structures are mutually co-constitutive. Agents are limited by structure, but by their practices may shape the structure (Giddens, 1984) .
Th e conventional version of constructivism is closer to the rationalist paradigm that dominated IR indivisibly until the 1990s and still seems to be more popular among scholars. Th e next section of the article presents how conventional constructivism came into being institutionally and how it positions itself in the fi eld of IR. At the end of the article, I will present the degree of popularity of the most important theories, with special focus on SC.
SC Reconciled with IR Mainstream?
Th e emergence of SC as a meta-theory, or a social theory, was not really in a dispute with theories like realism or liberalism, but rather with the rationalist paradigm. Even though my impression is that most scholars today perceive SC (SC) exactly as such, i.e. a general social theory, it does not mean that there were no attempts to position SC as another medium range theory, competing with (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism.
Th e main aim of the theories stemming from the rationalist paradigm was to create an analytical framework with enough explanatory and predicating potential to serve as a tool for an eff ective understanding of reality and to be useful for decision-making. For constructivists, this assumption is not self-evident and is actually proof of the rationalists' theories weaknesses. Th ese weaknesses encompass: ahistoricity, universalism and artificial autonomy of concepts from social processes. As presented before, these shortcomings seem to explain to a large extent why rationalist theories did not eff ectively account for the end of Cold War. From the perspective of SC, it is oversimplifi ed and invalid to perceive international relations as a static system saturated with stable relations, especially in the globalising, where constant change is determining a new world order. Th erefore, paradoxically, the rationalist assumption on the constancy of some rules of international relations (anarchy, self-help etc.), instead of facilitating successful forecasting, appeared to be false and prevented a valid prediction. SC, by accepting constant fl uidity of social relations, accounts for a change, arguing that it is the basis for a more reliable prediction.
SC, seen as a meta-theory, still limits its predicating ambitions. Th e main goal is to explain and understand the mechanisms of creating and reproducing meanings in social life and how they shape actors and their behaviours. Knowledge of these mechanisms allows for some limited generalisations, but they do not have the character of laws, therefore it is impossible to develop a complex theory that is valid in every context. Social constructivists made attempts to create a theory with a certain dose of reifi cation. Of course, the most notable attempt was by Alexander Wendt. In his landmark book "Th e Social Th eory of International Politics", he presented a complex theory of IR. Th e result of his endeavour is known as structural constructivism, as Wendt tried to reconcile SC with the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz (Sárváry, 2001) .
With the benefi t of hindsight, we can see that Wendt's approach is rather an exception among constructivists, as it challenges many of the ground assumptions of SC (McCourt, 2016) . First, Wendt reifi es the core element of the IR, namely the state. He treats states as complete, closed, unitary, non-emergent actors which fall outside the scope of inquiry. Second, Wendt accepts the epistemological premise of scientifi c realism -this is out of the constructivist canon. Scientifi c realism is based on the assumption that the cognition of a real, material world is possible and it is the fi nal aim of science. Of course, it goes against such foundations of SC as a double hermeneutic and ignores the social origins of knowledge and science. Th ese elements show that Alexander Wendt moved his theory into the direction of rationalist paradigm, which is irreconcilable with the constructivist paradigm. It explains why his proposal, very important for the development of SC in IR, was fi nally rejected by many social constructivists (Guzzini, Leander, op.cit.) .
Aft er all, the attempt of Alexander Wendt to reconcile constructivist "outcasts" with the mainstream of IR theories was successful, even if many of constructivists distance themselves from Wendt's perspective. Still, the "Th e Social Th eory of International Politics" remains as a very important point of reference, not only for constructivists, but for all scholars dealing with the theory in IR. It has also fostered the discussion about the differences between the conventional and critical versions of SC, their assets and limitations and possible applications in research. At the end of this article, I argue that the debate provoked by Wendt made constructivists to pose and answer the question of whether one should focus on Kantian phenomena or rather try to reach the understanding of noumenon (an object existing independently from human cognition; Kant, 1972) .
One of the results of the debate spurred by Wendt's book turned into the conclusion on the labour division between realism and SC (Guzzini, Leander, op.cit.). For example, the category of "interest" can be researched fruitfully from both perspectives. Realism takes care of identifi cation, description and operationalisation of the interest. Constructivism, in turn, describes and explains the mechanism leading to the creation of interests (e.g. securitisation), how they are understood by given actors and how they are reproduced within a given structure. We have to remember that the role of SC in this model is to problematise the very nature of the category of interest. From the constructivist perspective, it is not exogenic, but is the result of an interplay between power and knowledge, and as such it should be deconstructed and analysed. In this way, there is no direct confl ict between SC and realism, because SC remains a paradigm, while realism is used as a medium range theory and a methodological approach.
Wendt's work also served as an incentive for the methodological discussion within SC. Th e main argument here may be that it is possible to reach "constructivist goals" with the positivist methodology. From the constructivist perspective, positivist methodology is not an objective, reality-revealing system of methods, but rather an outcome of a long-term social process of knowledge accumulation. Th erefore, positivist methodology results from the development of a social system that we describe as science. SC may accept fi ndings of positivist research, while bearing in mind that it is a product of a highly contextualised process where certain rules of objectivity are met. It does not mean, of course, that this knowledge is independent from the researcher and their social context. On the contrary, it is a product of this context. Ergo, the constructivist perspective accepts the intersubjectivity of science and knowledge, in any given space, time and social context. In this view, there is no confl ict between the positivist and interpretivist methodology.
Th is "contextualised methodological conventionalism", as I call it, is, in my opinion, another element allowing the mainstreaming of SC in IR. Th e point is that by taking into account contextuality, SC can accept a given convention to partake in an epistemic community, preserving the critical stance towards this convention.
To sum up the above, we can distinguish three main stages of SC development: ■ 1980s/1990s -SC appears in IR as a result of an anti-positivist breakthrough. ■ 1990s -SC slowly takes place among other mainstream theories in IR. Attempts are made to reconcile constructivism with the rationalist paradigm (vide Wendt). ■ 21 st century -a clear tendency to "deconstruct a convention", meaning that conventional and structural constructivism are too far away from the foundations of the constructionist paradigm (McCourt, op.cit.) . On a side note, it is important to stress that, along with the changes described here, the aims of SC have been changing as well. In the fi rst stage, the axionormative element of SC was quite strong and aimed at the redefi nition of the relations of power. During the phase of "conventionalisation", the idea of a neutral scientifi c approach was dominant. Today, in turn, we can observe a comeback to the approach in which a researcher should also take into account their own agenda, meaning they cannot avoid some introspection and declaring their motivations. By this, they account for a personal opinion in the research, satisfying the requirement of intersubjectivity.
Instead of a conclusion
Because SC has become relevant in IR in the last 30 years, we can safely state that it has become one of the main paradigms in this fi eld of social sciences. We have at hand both qualitative and quantitative data to prove that IR scholars perceive constructivism as an approach that they use most oft en: human-to-human relations belong. Elements such as culture, religion, tradition, collective experience, habitus etc. are important. What is the most important, though, is the fact that meanings constantly change. Th erefore, in order to understand them and to be able to "stay on top of things" (whatever it means in any given context), it is necessary to know the process of triangulation of meanings.
In spite of their many successes, social constructivists still have many areas where additional work is needed. Th e main question of whether SC is a paradigm/meta-theory or a theory of IR seems to remain unresolved, especially within many national spaces of IR scholarships functioning largely autonomously or even separately, divided along the borders of states. A signifi cant debate on the methodology is still taking place: is a positivist methodology acceptable at all from the constructivist perspective, or should one use only refl exive and interpretative methods? Th e issue of the utilitarianism of SC remains unclear -should the researcher reveal their motives and take them into account, or should they rather strive towards the ideal of an absolute normative neutrality?
Even though these questions are very important and should spur a lot of debates and intellectual ferment, it seems that IR and SC are stuck in some kind of retention. A 2015 study has shown that over 75% of all social sciences articles written in the USA are not being cited even once (Bok, 2015) . Many works consist mostly of BA/MA-thesis-like introductions, with loads of references, but with little to no value added. Th is problem is visible within the social constructivist approach. Th e question remains: is there still potential in this approach, maybe in the form of the sociology of knowledge, that could lead to another breakthrough and an advancement of the fi eld?
